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Mending the Wound or Pulling It 
Apart? New Proposals for International 
Investment Courts and Fragmentation 
of International Investment Law 
Jaemin Lee* 
Abstract: Robust discussions on standing investment courts are currently taking 
place at various fora. In particular, negotiations to include bilateral investment 
courts in IIAs are in full swing and leading to the creation of such courts. On the 
other hand, negotiation for a multilateral investment court has yet to start. Even 
if negotiation begins, it is not clear how long it will take and whether it will indeed 
lead to a successful conclusion. As such, for a significant amount of time in the 
future, it is bilateral investment courts that states administer to resolve investment 
disputes. Bilateral investment courts, however, will further deepen the already 
existing fragmentation of international investment law. They will be unable to 
issue harmonized and consistent jurisprudence for similar or essentially the same 
legal issues. In addition, they will more easily stoke sovereignty infringement 
claims by domestic critics. If legitimacy enhancement is the ultimate objective of 
the present ISDS reform discussions, it will only be achieved through a 
multilateral court. This is the only alternative to address the basic concern that 
has prompted the ISDS reform debates in general and the court proposals in 
particular. Global efforts should be mobilized to initiate and conclude 
negotiations for the establishment of a multilateral court as promptly as possible. 
In the interim, current negotiations to create and adopt bilateral courts should be 
suspended.  
                                                          
* Ph.D., LL.M., LL.B. (Seoul National University); LL.M. (Georgetown University Law 
Center); J.D. (Boston College Law School). Professor of Law, School of Law, Seoul National 
University, Seoul, Korea. The author can be reached via e-mail at jaemin@snu.ac.kr. The core 
idea of this article was presented at the international conference (The Harvard-Geneva-
Renmin-Sydney Law Faculty Conference) entitled Law and Development, organized by and 
held at Harvard Law School on July 16-18, 2017. The author would like to thank the organizers 
of and participants in the conference for their valuable comments and suggestions. 
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At present, international dispute settlement proceedings are actively 
being utilized by states. These proceedings have contributed to the 
development of international law and have become core elements of major 
treaties; in particular, they play an important role in enforcing those treaties 
as well as developing and clarifying provisions within those treaties. 
In the meantime, as procedural loopholes and inconsistencies are 
identified with respect to these proceedings, efforts are also being made to 
fill the loopholes, avoid inconsistencies, and further elaborate procedural 
rules for the proceedings. Along the lines of these efforts, various suggestions 
and proposals have been made, triggering lively discussions and debates. 
These efforts are generally aimed at introducing further procedural rules and 
adding more detailed steps to the existing dispute settlement mechanism of 
international law. 
For instance, with respect to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
dispute settlement proceedings, negotiations have been underway for many 
years to amend the existing system codified in the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”). 1 
Negotiations have focused on fixing structural problems identified through 
the application of the DSU since 1995 and introducing more detailed and 
coherent provisions in the agreement, so as to enhance the rule of law in the 
global trading regime.2  Given the relatively strong consensus among the 
WTO Members, the DSU amendment is regarded as one of the early harvest 
issues once a new negotiation round begins in the near future.3 
Likewise, regarding investor-state dispute settlement proceedings 
(“ISDS proceedings”), new efforts are now being made to upgrade and 
reform existing proceedings contained in International Investment 
Agreements (“IIA”), which can be either Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(“BITs”) or Investment Chapters of Free Trade Agreements (“FTA”). Here 
also, various proposals and suggestions have been made by many states and 
entities, and have found their way into respective IIAs, one way or another. 
Most recently, the European Union proposed a new scheme that would 
potentially change the basic framework of the current ISDS proceedings. 
Among the new ideas and suggestions is the proposal to introduce a new 
standing court on a bilateral basis, equipped with an appellate system and 
coupled with strong ethical rules for appointed judges. The proposal then 
suggests the creation of a multilateral investment court on a global level. The 
                                                          
1 World Trade Organization, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, (April 15, 1994). 
 2 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declarations, WT/MIN(01)/EDC/1 (Nov. 
14, 2001), at paras. 30, 47; World Trade Organization, Decision on the Application and Review 
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlements of Disputes. 
 3 See WTO’s website 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm#negotiations. 
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EU proposal has since prompted robust discussions in the international 
community. 4  In many respects, the proposal draws from the successful 
experience of the WTO’s DSU and practice of the Dispute Settlement Body 
(“DSB”); although the WTO DSU does not adopt a standing “court” system,5 
various practical issues tested in the WTO’s DSU such as the constitution of 
a panel, the relationship between a panel and the Appellate Body, a code of 
conduct for panelists and Appellate Body members, and their compensation 
scales appear in the EU proposal in one form or another.6 In a sense, this 
exemplifies that the WTO’s DSU and its practice have become a beacon for 
other international dispute settlement proceedings. 
Within the specific circumstances of the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (“TTIP”), the EU proposal submits a bilateral 
investment court between the EU and the United States, while noting the 
anticipation of the advent of a multilateral court.7 The basic format has been 
adopted in the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (“EU-Vietnam FTA”), 8  the Free Trade 
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore 
(“EU-Singapore FTA”), 9  and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement between the European Union and Canada (“CETA”). 10  It is 
reported that the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and 
Japan (“EU-Japan FTA”) will not follow this path, and will instead adopt 
existing ISDS proceedings.11 Therefore, as the situation currently stands, 
                                                          
 4 See Stephan W. Schill, The European Commission’s Proposal of an “Investment Court 
System” for TTIP: Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block for Multilateralizing International 
Investment Law? (EC Proposal of an Investment Court for TTIP), ASIL Insights (2016); see 
M. Sornarajah, An International Investment Court: Panacea or Purgatory?, Columbia FDI 
Perspectives: Perspectives on Topical Foreign Direct Investment Issues (2016). 
 5 It should also be noted that the WTO’s own DSU amendment negotiations include as 
one of the key topics the creation of a standing panel, which may resemble the standing 
investment court of the EU proposal in core respects. 
 6 See European Commission, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Trade in 
Services, Investment and E-Commerce, Chapter II—Investment, Commission draft text 
TTIP—Investment, (“TTIP draft text on investment”) (2016). 
 7 Id. 
 8 See European Commission, Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2016). 
 9 It should be noted that the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the 
Republic of Singapore (“EU-Singapore FTA”) does not establish a bilateral investment court 
officially. However, other major elements of the original EU proposal have been included in 
the agreement which are closely related to the creation of a court. The EU-Singapore FTA can 
be said to have adopted a ‘hybrid’ system. In that regard, the basic format of the recent 
proposals has still been incorporated by this FTA as well. See European Commission, Free 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (2015). 
 10 See European Commission, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between 
the European Union and Canada (“CETA”) (2016). 
 11 See European Commission, Report of the 16th EU-Japan FTA/EPA Negotiating round 
(2016). 
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proposals for standing investment courts submitted by the EU, other 
countries, and other entities can be summarized as (i) establishment and 
operation of ‘bilateral’ investment courts under IIAs and (ii) mobilization of 
joint efforts for the creation of a ‘multilateral’ court in the future. In other 
words, the proposals envisage multiple courts under respective IIAs and at 
least one above the IIAs in the foreseeable future – hence this article using 
the term “international investment courts” in the plural form. 
Needless to say, because proposed changes are expected to enhance 
trust in the decision-making process of the ISDS proceedings, there are 
obvious advantages gained from these efforts to reform existing investment 
dispute settlement proceedings and introduce standing international 
investment courts, both bilaterally and multilaterally.12 If anything, with this 
change, it is expected that the legitimate policy space of sovereign 
governments could be better preserved while guaranteeing the agreed level 
of protection for foreign investors. Most notably, the new courts will help 
enhance the legitimacy of the entire procedure.13 
At the same time, as much as this new idea purports to change the 
existing paradigm, it may also bring into the equation various legal problems 
and practical questions. In particular, the possible implication of introducing 
multiple international investment courts, which would hold a fragmented 
structure of law based on 3,367 IIAs, has not been adequately discussed.14 
One of the unique characteristics of international investment law is its 
fragmented regime, and this is also a major source that fosters continuing 
legitimacy challenges in terms of the rule of law through ISDS proceedings. 
This is in contrast to the multilateral trade regime under the WTO and its 
dispute settlement mechanism. Any major reform proposal of the ISDS 
proceedings, therefore, would be expected to address or at least alleviate the 
fragmentation problem. Caution is required when considering a major 
reform, should the introduction of investment courts maintain or even deepen 
the existing problem. This article argues that the current proposals for 
investment courts carry the potential for firmer and deeper fragmentation at 
least for the time being, and possibly for some significant time in the future. 
It then contends that the fragmentation can only be alleviated through the 
creation of a multilateral court and ultimately be addressed by the adoption 
of a multilateral agreement in international investment law. Thus, the critical 
point is how quickly the international community can (1) establish a 
                                                          
 12 See Giovanni Zarra, The Issue of Incoherence in Investment Arbitration: Is There Need 
for a Systemic Reform?, 17 Chinese J. Int’l L. 111, 142 (2018). 
 13 See Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, Society of 
International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural Conference 2008 Working Paper No. 22/08 
(2008); see also European Commission, Why the New EU Proposal For An Investment Court 
System in TTIP is Beneficial to both States and Investors (“Why The TTIP Court System is 
Beneficial”) (2015). 
 14 See U.N. Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) International Investment 
Agreement (IIA) Database website. 
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multilateral court and (2) more importantly, reach consensus on a multilateral 
investment agreement. So, it should be confirmed as much as possible at this 
juncture that a multilateral court (and ultimately a multilateral agreement) is 
not merely another option but a ‘must’ if the global community is to 
overcome the current structural problem. The local sprawling of bilateral 
courts would only further complicate the problem. This article proposes a 
moratorium on bilateral investment court establishment: during the pendency 
of the negotiation to establish a multilateral court in the international 
community, while setting aside a more time-consuming and difficult task of 
adopting a multilateral agreement on investment, establishing bilateral 
investment courts should not be pursued in new IIAs. 
With this in mind, Section II of the article first provides an overview of 
the EU proposal, the paragon of new proposals for investment courts. Section 
III then explains the basic operating mechanism of investment courts as 
envisaged in these proposals. Section IV discusses the implication of 
investment courts for the fragmentation phenomenon. A suggestion for a 
future course of action in this regard is provided in Section V and the 
conclusion then follows in Section VI. 
II. 2015 EU PROPOSAL FOR INVESTMENT COURT: AN 
OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT 
In September 2015 the European Union proposed a new scheme that 
would significantly change the framework of the current international 
investment agreements and ISDS proceedings. 15  The EU proposal 
particularly submitted new ideas for amending the current ISDS proceedings. 
Among the new ideas the suggestion to introduce a new standing court to 
resolve investment disputes stands out.16 There have been robust discussions 
in the international community and among scholars regarding a standing 
investment court. Some countries have agreed to the EU proposal and 
adopted an investment court and appellate mechanism in their respective 
FTAs or BITs. Canada 17  and Vietnam 18  offer such examples. The EU 
                                                          
 15 Press release by European Commission, Commission Proposes New Investment Court 
System for TTIP and Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations (“Commission’s 
Investment Court Proposal for TTIP”) (2015); Louise Woods, Fit for purposes? The EU’s 
Investment Court System (2016), Kluwer Arbitration Blog. 
 16 See supra note 6, at art. 9-12. It is believed that France and Germany have been in 
strong support of the proposal to introduce standing courts. See Marco Bronckers, Is Investor–
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Superior to Litigation Before Domestic Courts? An EU View 
on Bilateral Trade Agreements, 18 J. Int’l Econ. L. 656-57 (2015). 
 17 See Isabelle Michou et al., TTIP: 12th Round of Negotiations Concludes, Investment 
Protection Remains High on the Agenda; Plus Newly Published CETA Text Includes EU’s 
Investment Court System Proposal (2016); Government of Canada, Joint Statement by 
European Commissioner for Trade and Canada’s Minister of International Trade on Canada-
EU Trade Agreement (2016). 
 18 See European Commission, The EU and Vietnam Finalize Landmark Trade Deal 
(2015); see EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 8; see Cecilia Malmström, Done Deal with Vietnam 
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submits that this scheme is a “must” for its future IIAs.19 On the other hand, 
other countries such as the United States and Japan seem to be rather 
cautious, if not entirely skeptical, about this EU proposal.20 
There are obvious merits to introducing a standing investment court, as 
it will enhance trust in the decision-making process of international 
investment disputes.21 Conflict of interest between arbitrators can also be 
avoided more efficiently under the new scheme. The investment court may 
also be more open to understanding the need to preserve the legitimate policy 
space of sovereign governments. 22  Most importantly, international 
investment courts will help enhance the legitimacy of the ISDS 
proceedings. 23  The reasons that an international investment court can 
enhance legitimacy of the procedure are explained as follows: 
Firstly, an international investment court can ensure the impartiality of 
the dispute resolution process. Unlike arbitrators who are appointed for each 
case, often by the parties or an appointing authority, judges are randomly 
                                                          
(2015). 
 19 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision Authorising the 
Commission to Negotiate a Convention to Establish a Multilateral Court on Investment on 
Behalf of the EU in Line with Article 218 of the Treaty Together With Negotiating Directives 
(2016); see European Commission, Why the TTIP Court System is Beneficial; European 
Commission, European Commission—Fact Sheet (2015). 
 20 See Krista Hughes & Philip Blenkinsop, U.S. Wary of EU Proposal for Investment 
Court in Trade Pact, Reuters, (Oct. 29, 2015); see Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, The 
U.S. is Skeptical of the European Commission’s ISDS Proposal (2015). 
 21 European Commission, Reading Guide to the Draft Text on Investment Protection and 
Investment Court System in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
(2018); European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution of 8 July 2015 Containing the 
European Parliament’s Recommendations to the European Commission on the Negotiations 
for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (“Resolution of 8 July 2015”); 
Ingo Venzke, Investor-State Dispute Settlement in TTIP from the Perspective of a Public Law 
Theory of International Adjudication, 17 J. World Inv. & Trade 394 (2016); European 
Commission, “Commission’s Investment Court Proposal for TTIP” supra note 15, (“With our 
proposals for a new Investment Court System, we are breaking new ground. The new 
Investment Court System will be composed of fully qualified judges, proceedings will be 
transparent, and cases will be decided on the basis of clear rules. In addition, the Court will be 
subject to review by a new Appeal Tribunal. With this new system, we protect the 
governments’ right to regulate, and ensure that investment disputes will be adjudicated in full 
accordance with the rule of law.”); See Cecilia Malmström, supra note 18 (“What has clearly 
come out of the debate is that the old, traditional form of dispute resolution suffers from a 
fundamental lack of trust. However, EU investors are the most frequent users of the existing 
model, which individual EU countries have developed over time. This means that Europe must 
take the responsibility to reform and modernise it. We must take the global lead on the path to 
reform.” “We want to establish a new system built around the elements that make citizens 
trust domestic or international courts. I’m making this proposal public at the same time that I 
send it to the European Parliament and the Member States. It’s very important to have an open 
and transparent exchange of views on this widely debated issue.”). 
 22 See European Parliament, “Resolution of 8 July 2015”, supra note 21; see also Ingo 
Venzke, Investor-State Dispute Settlement in TTIP, supra note 21, at 394. 
 23 See supra note 13. 
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assigned to a case and have a secure tenure. International investment court 
judges will be able to make their decisions without any repercussions and 
thus will not have any bias toward a party.24 After all, “no one can say that 
the judge was predisposed to decide a case or interpreted the law in a way 
that would increase his or her prospects for future income and career 
advancement.”25 
Secondly, having a single international investment court will ensure that 
a uniform standard will be applied to all cases, increasing the predictability 
of the outcome. Currently, different tribunals grant seemingly contradictory 
awards in international investment arbitration, a situation that adversely 
affects both the legitimacy and predictability of awards.26 
Thirdly, the European Commission’s proposal for creating an 
international investment court also includes creating an appellate court.27 In 
contrast to arbitration that normally does not allow an award to be appealed, 
an appellate court will ensure that errors made in the court of first instance 
will be corrected.28 
Fourthly, compared to arbitration, bringing a case to the international 
investment court will cost less for parties (especially small and medium 
enterprises). Judges in the international investment court will receive salaries 
from member states, which decreases the financial burden of private parties.29 
In addition, small and medium enterprises will be able to bring a case to a 
sole judge if the amount in dispute is relatively small, and will not have to 
pay all of the other parties’ fees even if it loses a case.30 
At the same time, there are various legal problems and questions relating 
                                                          
 24 See supra note 13, at 16-17 (arguing that “the absence of security of tenure leads to a 
reasonable judgment that the system is stacked, to put it crudely, in favour of investors and 
against host states” because the appointing authority is often an institution that represents the 
interests of “foreign investors and the major capital-exporting states”). 
 25 Id. at 20. 
 26 See generally Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 
1521 (2005); see generally Anders Nilsson & Oscar Englesson, Inconsistent Awards in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration: Is an Appeals Court Needed?, 30 J. of Int’l Arb. 561 (2013). 
 27 European Commission, “Commission’s Investment Court Proposal for TTIP”, supra 
note 15. 
 28 José E. Alvarez, Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Investment Chapter the New “Gold 
Standard”?, Int’l Inv. L. J. (Working Paper 2016/3) (stating that “the Appellate Tribunal in 
particular is seen as ensuring greater coherency in investment law, while also providing, unlike 
the limited ICSID annulment process, the possibility for correcting erroneous interpretations 
of law or egregious errors in fact-finding”); Cf. Freya Baetens, The European Union’s 
Proposed Investment Court System: Addressing Criticisms of Investor-State Arbitration while 
Raising New Challenges, 43 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 381(2016) (pointing out 
that the possibility of appeals will ultimately “enhance the acceptability and legitimacy of the 
resulting decision” by providing a “second opinion”). 
 29 European Commission, TTIP draft text on investment, supra note 6, at art. 9.13, 10.13. 
 30 European Commission, Commission’s Investment Court Proposal for TTIP”, supra 
note 15. 
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to this proposal. For instance, it is not clear whether the operation and 
administration of an investment court is compatible with the provisions of 
the ICSID Convention.31 It is also questionable whether a standing court 
stays within the general parameters of an investment arbitration. 32  In 
addition, to the extent that the core problems of the ISDS proceedings lie in 
the fragmented nature of the international investment agreements system,33 
and unless this system itself is somehow amended as a result of introducing 
a multilateral regime in international investment law, the introduction of the 
court system may not be able to address these problems. Any contribution it 
makes, if any at all, should be minimal or marginal. If anything, the 
fragmentation phenomenon can become more acute with the introduction of 
bilateral investment courts from agreement to agreement. 
In consideration of introducing an investment court, all of these related 
legal and practical issues should preferably be contemplated at the same time. 
Apparently, the current proposal of the EU has not yet addressed these legal 
and practical issues in an in-depth manner. 
III. BASIC OPERATING MECHANISM OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT COURTS 
The proposed investment courts are supposed to be formed by 
respective FTAs and BITs. 34  While these agreements do mention the 
possibility of having a multilateral court on a global basis that may have 
jurisdiction over investment disputes from various FTAs and BITs, the first 
step is to seek the introduction and establishment of bilateral courts within 
the rubric of respective FTAs and BITs. It is true that the global community 
                                                          
 31 See Mateus Aimoré Carreteiro, Appellate Arbitral Rules in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 33 J. Int’l Arb. 185 (2016); Barbara Helene Steindl, ICSID Annulment vs. Set 
Aside by State Courts, 4 Yearbook on Int’l Arb. 181 (2015); Gloria Maria Alvarez, et al., A 
Response to the Criticism against ISDS by EFILA, 33 J. Int’l Arb. 1, 10-11 (2016). 
 32 J.J. Saulino & Josh Kallmer, The Emperor Has No Clothes: A Critique of the Debate 
over Reform of the ISDS System, in Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Jubin-Bret (eds.), Reshaping the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century (Boston, Brill 
Nijhoff, 2015), at 498; Eduardo Zuleta, The Challenges of Creating a Standing International 
Investment Court, in Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Jubin-Bret (eds.), Reshaping the Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century (Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 2015), at 403. 
 33 In addition, not only inter-IIA (that is, IIA-to-IIA) fragmentation, but also intra-IIA 
fragmentation is also being observed as more new rules and procedures are being introduced 
into an IIA. For instance, recent IIAs now introduce ‘mediation’ procedures as an alternative 
to or as an additional option for, standard ISDS proceedings. See generally, Chunlei Zhao, 
Investor-State Mediation in a China-EU Bilateral Investment Treaty: Talking About Being in 
the Right Place at the Right Time, 17 Chinese J. Int’l L. 111 (2018). These additional dispute 
settlement proceedings certainly provide benefits to disputing parties for a specific dispute in 
a particular IIA, but may run the risk of further complicating dispute settlement proceedings 
contained in an IIA. 
 34 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Michele Potesta, Can the Mauritius Convention serve 
as a Model for the Reform of Investor-State Arbitration in Connection with the Introduction 
of a Permanent Investment Tribunal or an Appeal Mechanism?, CIDS Report (2016). 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 39:1 (2018) 
10 
may initiate negotiations to discuss a multilateral investment court that has 
jurisdiction over all (or a majority of) investment disputes, such as WTO’s 
dispute settlement proceedings, but any negotiation has yet to take place.35 
Even if a negotiation for the sole purpose of establishing a multilateral court 
is initiated, it is indeed difficult to predict with reliable precision whether 
such negotiation will be able to lead to a global consensus and an ensuing 
convention, or how long it will take to complete such negotiation, and more 
importantly, how many countries will accede to the convention and how 
fast.36 
Should previous experience offer any guidance, a negotiation to 
establish a multilateral regime in international investment law is both 
treacherous and time-consuming. As a matter of fact, the idea of an 
international investment court was submitted as early as 1946 when the 
aborted International Trade Organization was being discussed.37 Afterwards, 
similar discussions also took place in the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”) and Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”), but failed to produce any tangible outcome.38 The 
Unified Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital, a multilateral 
investment agreement among Middle East states, actually established an 
investment court. 39  This court, however, was barely utilized and even 
contracting parties of the multilateral agreement apparently preferred to 
utilize the ICSID arbitration proceedings.40 More recently, Professor Van 
Harten proposed a similar idea in 2007. 41  The 2008 Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty of Germany 42  and 2015 World Investment Report 
published by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(“UNCTAD”) 43  also included a similar court proposal. In addition, the 
ongoing discussion to introduce a dispute settlement proceeding under the 
                                                          
 35 The UNCITRAL has recently decided to discuss ISDS proceedings reform through one 
of its working groups. Specific topics and schedules of future discussions are not yet adopted. 
Possible establishment of investment courts is likely to be included in the discussions, but 
specific features of the courts—whether it is a single multilateral court such as WTO’s panel 
and the Appellate Body, regional courts combining regional IIAs, or bilateral courts under 
individual IIAs—have not been discussed yet and are unclear at this stage. See U.N.G.A., 
Possible Future Work in the Field of Dispute Settlement: Reforms of Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) (2017). 
 36 See Zarra, supra note 12, at 178-182. 
 37 See Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, Permanent Investment Tribunals: The Momentum is 
Building Up, in Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Jubin-Bret (eds.), Reshaping the Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 21st Century (Boston, Brill Nijhoff, 2015). 
 38 Id. at 404-406. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 406. 
 41 See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2007), at 180-182, 184. 
 42 See Germany Model BIT (2008). 
 43 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment 
Governance (“World Investment Report 2015”) (New York & Geneva, 2015), at 133, 152. 
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umbrella of the Union of South American Nations also explores a standing 
investment court idea. 44 So, the investment court idea is not necessarily the 
brainchild of the EU, but has been discussed on and off for the past several 
decades. However, none of the previous discussions have actually 
culminated in a universally multilateral convention. The only investment 
court in operation failed to secure active utilization by the parties. 
The ambitious negotiation of 1997 to adopt Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment failed to reach a consensus.45 Negotiations to address investment 
issues in the context of WTO Agreements also secured a similar fate.46 The 
Mauritius Convention, adopted through the initiatives of UNCITRAL on 
December 10, 2015 and set to go into effect on October 18, 2017, 47  is 
arguably the first meaningful multilateral achievement in this respect, but as 
of August 1, 2017 only three states have ratified it.48 The rather slow pace of 
ratification of this convention should be understood in the light of the fact 
that the transparency issue is one of the easiest items in IIAs, as apparently 
few countries can oppose the concept of transparency in ISDS proceedings.49 
Viewed from this perspective, future negotiations to introduce a 
multilateral investment court through an international convention would be 
                                                          
 44 See supra note 37, at 399-401; Catharine Titi, The European Union’s Proposal for an 
International Investment Court: Significance, Innovations and Challenges Ahead, 1 
Transnat’l Dispute Mgmt. 2 (2017); see Markus Krajewski, Model Bilateral Investment Treaty 
with Investor-state Dispute Settlement for Industrial Countries, Giving Consideration to the 
U.S., Project No. 83/15 of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy at 19; see 
supra note 43, at 152; UNCTAD, Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development 
2015 (“Investment Policy Framework 2015”) (2015); Katia Fach Gómez & Catharine Titi, 
International Investment Law and ISDS: Mapping Contemporary Latin America, in Katia 
Fach Gomez & Catharine Titi (eds.), The Latin American Challenge to the Current System of 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 17 J. of World Inv. and Trade 14, (2016). 
 45 The negotiation began in 1995 and it was discontinued in April 1998. See OECD, 
OECD Begins Negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, SG/PRESS(95) 65 
(1995), for the launching of MAI; OECD, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment Draft 
Consolidated Text, DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 (1998), for the last document text drafted in 
1998. 
 46 In 1996, the Singapore Ministerial Declaration was adopted which contained 
agreements to establish a Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment. 
See https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm (2018). 
However, the working group report was published only up to July 2003. The last working 
group report on the relationship between trade and investment can be found at the WTO 
website. See WTO, Report on the Meeting Held on 10 and 11 June 2003, WT/WGTI/M/22 
(Jul. 17, 2003). 
 47 See 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparency_Convention
.html. 
 48 Canada ratified on 12 December 2016, Mauritius on 5 June 2015, and Switzerland on 




 49 See supra note 34, at 14-15. 
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by no means simple or be achieved in a short time frame. Even after the 
completion of the negotiation and adoption of a convention, it would 
probably take a significant amount of time to see a court in actual operation. 
Under these circumstances, a more realistic prediction with respect to the 
proposal of investment courts, at least for the time being, would be bilateral 
investment courts established under respective IIAs.50 How this development 
may affect the existing regime of international investment law and the 
administration of IIAs merits the immediate attention of the global 
community at this juncture. At this stage, it is unclear how many states will 
also be open to the idea of creating a multilateral investment court.51 
In short, regardless of the desire of the states in the global community, 
a “bilateral investment court” system is arguably a more likely outcome in 
the near future. It is a way station to the final destination of a “multilateral 
investment court” system, but it is not clear how long states will have to stay 
in the way station.52 While the states are in the way station, it is most likely 
that investment disputes will continue to rise in number and scope.53 
A. Multiplication of International Investment Courts 
Assuming a bilateral investment court system will spread or take hold 
in the immediate future, there will be significant changes in ISDS 
proceedings. One of the most significant changes will be the multiplication 
of investment courts. If individual IIAs have separate investment courts, in 
theory there will be as many investment courts as IIAs. Should this 
experiment be confined to newly concluded IIAs, the total number of 
international investment courts will still multiply quickly because new FTAs 
are being negotiated and old ones amended.54 The creation and constitution 
of an investment court are to be carried out by the two contracting parties of 
                                                          
 50 There are 600 bilateral investment treaties in the world and 191 treaties that separately 
have investment provisions. Statistics can be checked at the UNCITRAL website. See 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicableIia. 
 51 See supra note 28, at 538 (pointing out that “most of Asia’s governments do not do 
international courts”). 
 52 See supra note 12, at 178-81 (arguing that the completion of the adoption of a new 
system may not be able to be completed in a short timeframe). 
 53 According to the statistics from investment policy hub of UNCTAD, the total number 
of arbitrations initiated in 2016 are 62. Analysis in terms of an annual basis does not clearly 
show a constant upward surge in the numbers of arbitrations initiated. However, the five-year 
average shows that there has definitely been an increase in the number of arbitrations initiated: 
62.6 between 2012 and 2016, 42 between 2007 and 2011, 34.4 between 2002 and 2006, 12 
between 1997 and 2001 and 6.5 between 1993 and 1996. The statistics can be found at the 
UNCTAD website. See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByYear. 
 54 The recent FTAs with investment provisions include the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(“TPP”) Agreement, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”), 
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (“CETA”), Free Trade Agreement between the 
European Union and the Republic of Vietnam (“EU-Vietnam FTA”), and Free Trade 
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (“EU-Singapore 
FTA”). 
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the IIA in question.55 
Each investment court will then have its own mediators, judges and 
appellate judges.56  It will have its own rules of procedure and logistical 
support mechanism.57 As a court, judges and appellate judges appointed to it 
will be subject to stringent ethics codes58 and most notably precluded from 
taking cases in their private capacity.59 Their activities will be monitored 
closely by a joint committee or commission comprising representatives of 
the contracting parties.60 Most importantly, these individual courts will have 
exclusive jurisdiction over investment disputes arising from their respective 
IIAs within the framework of “self-contained regimes.”61 
B. Individual Appellate Proceedings 
The individualization and ensuing multiplication will extend to the 
appellate mechanism. The possibility of introducing an appellate proceeding 
has long been one of the priority topics in discussions on ISDS proceedings.62 
As such, appellate proceedings have become one of the core elements of 
                                                          
 55 See supra note 34, at 6. 
 56 The provisions in the TPP Agreement only involves a selection of arbitrators. See 
United States Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partnership Full Text, ch. 9 Investment 
(“TPP Investment chapter”), at art. 9.22 Selection of Arbitrators. TTIP involves mediators, 
judges and appeal tribunal members. See European Commission, “TTIP draft text on 
investment”, supra note 6, at art. 9.2, 10.2; see European Commission, “TTIP draft text on 
investment”, supra note 6, at ANNEX I of TTIP Investment chapter, art. 3. CETA involves 
arbitrators and mediators. See European Commission, CETA, supra note 10, at ANNEX 29. 
EU-Singapore FTA involves arbitrators and mediators. See European Commission, EU-
Singapore FTA, supra note 9, at ANNEX 9-F. EU-Vietnam FTA involves mediators, 
members of the tribunal and members of the appeal tribunal. See European Commission, EU-
Vietnam FTA, supra note 8, at ch. 13, sec. 3, art. 5.4, 12.2, 13. 
 57 See e.g. European Commission, TTIP draft text on investment, supra note 6, at art. 
11.16-12.15; European Commission, EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 8, at art. 12.18-13.18; 
European Commission, CETA, supra note 10, at art. 8.27.16. 
 58 See e.g. European Commission, TTIP Draft Text on Investment, supra note 6, at art. 
11; European Commission, EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 8, at ch. 13, sec. 3, art. 14; European 
Commission, CETA, supra note 10, at ch. 8, art. 8.30. 
 59 See id. 
 60 See id. 
 61 See e.g. supra note 6, at sec. 2, art. 1-13; European Commission, CETA, supra note 10, 
at ch. 8, art. 8.2; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU-VIETNAM FTA, supra note 8, at sec. 3, art. 1-16; 
supra note 9, at sec. A, art. 9.2; U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TPP Investment Chapter, supra 
note 56, at art. 9.2-9.25. 
 62 While there are some review features contained in investment arbitrations, they are 
limited to specific instances requiring such reviews and do not constitute the conventional 
appeal mechanism where the legal issues of underlying tribunals’ decisions are challenged. 
As for the ICSID Convention, see art. 49.2 Measures for Review Mechanism include 
Rectification, art. 50 Interpretation, art. 51 Revision, and art. 52 Annulment. See also Jaemin 
Lee, Introduction of an Appellate Review Mechanism for International Investment Disputes 
11 Transnat’l Dispute Mgmt. 12 (2014). 
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investment court proposals.63 International investment courts are designed to 
have an appellate mechanism in place. In other words, individual investment 
courts will have as many appellate proceedings as well. 
A standing court, detached from the conventional concept of arbitration, 
is also closely intertwined with the proposal to introduce an appellate 
mechanism. Traditionally, ISDS proceedings, despite being of paramount 
importance to the states and foreign investors concerned, are subject to a 
singular, one-time decision-making formula and do not contain an appellate 
review mechanism.64 As a matter of fact, key characteristics of international 
investment arbitration are its promptness and simplicity, which has been 
made possible, to a large extent, through the absence of an appellate review 
mechanism. 65  Now, this atmosphere is changing and a plea for the 
introduction of an appellate proceeding is arguably gathering cautious 
support. 66  Recent proposals for investment courts also come with sub-
proposals to introduce appellate mechanisms at the same time.67 
Each IIA has its own procedures to constitute and administer appellate 
proceedings. 68  Individual appellate courts are supposed to pronounce 
jurisprudence that will bind the investment court of first instance.69 As each 
appellate court is a supreme interpreter and decision maker for the respective 
IIA within the framework of a “self-contained regime,” appellate courts of 
various IIAs will be on equal standing and may sometimes compete for 
jurisprudence for the same or similar issues. 
From a practical perspective, enabling appeals will lead to a longer 
dispute resolution process, as appeals will become the new norm for many 
                                                          
 63 See e.g. supra note 6, at art. 10; European Commission, EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 
8, at ch. 13, art. 13; see supra note 10, at ch. 8, art. 8.28. 
 64 See Katia Yannaca-Small, Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 
Working Paper 2006/01, at 8. 
 65 See id. 
 66 See id; UNCTAD, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a 
Roadmap (“Reform of ISDS”), UNCTAD IIA Issues Note (2013); European Commission, 
Factsheet on Investor-State Dispute Settlement (2013); Stephan W. Schill, Reforming 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Conceptual Framework and Options for the Way 
Forward (“Reforming ISDS”), The E15 Initiative, ICTSD. 
 67 European Commission, EU Finalizes Proposal for Investment Protection and Court 
System for TTIP, News Archive (Nov. 12, 2015). 
 68 See e.g. supra note 6, at art. 10, art. 29; see supra note 8, at ch. 13, art. 13, art. 28; see 
supra note 10, at ch. 8, art. 8.28. 
 69 See supra note 6, at art. 29; see supra note 8, at art. 28; see supra note 10, art. 8.28.9. 
It should be noted, however, that at least in the original EU proposal of September 2015, it is 
not entirely clear whether the court of first instance is bound by the decision of the appellate 
tribunal or if the lower court can consider the decision of the appellate court. See supra note 
6, at art. 29.2. Regardless, it is hard to envisage a situation where the court of first instance 
issues a judgment, in spite of a conflicting decision or jurisprudence announced by the 
appellate tribunal. So in practice, there will not be a meaningful difference and the decision of 
the appellate court will be (virtually) binding on the investment court. 
International Investment Law 
39:1 (2018) 
15 
parties.70 A longer process will lead to an increase in expenses, which will be 
disadvantageous to parties that are less financially stable.71 
C. Party-Funded and Party-Operated Courts 
A bilateral investment court approach is based on the notion that each 
court is to be funded and operated by contracting parties.72 The idea assumes 
that each party maintains and is able to mobilize the expertise as well as the 
financial and logistical resources to meet the demand. In other words, this 
scheme requires a more active engagement and participation of contracting 
parties on an on-going basis.73 
There are of course obvious benefits of the introduction and 
establishment of standing courts which have jurisdiction over investment 
disputes arising from IIAs. Indeed, the introduction of standing courts will 
have the effect of facilitating ISDS proceedings and will reduce the logistical 
burden in that respect. For instance, at present, due to the ad hoc nature of an 
arbitration tribunal, disputing parties usually spend substantial time selecting 
arbitrators in the initial stage of the ISDS proceedings believing that the fate 
of the dispute is heavily dependent upon arbitrator selection. 74  So, a 
permanent court could arguably ensure more efficient proceedings in the 
early stage of a dispute by dispensing with the time-consuming process of 
that selection.75 
At the same time, it is expected that full-time, or at least exclusively 
employed, judges of a standing court could help introduce higher standards 
of professionalism and experience, and therefore ensure appropriate fact-
finding and application of the relevant jurisprudence of international 
investment disputes. Having a group of previously designated or appointed 
adjudicators would also help ensure systemic avoidance of conflict of interest 
for these adjudicators. This aspect will also facilitate the ISDS proceedings 
generally in the right direction. 
The EU proposal and other proposals for international investment courts 
underscore these presumed benefits. 76  The benefits stemming from the 
introduction of an international investment court (or investment courts) 
                                                          
 70 See supra note 28, at 379; Christian J. Tams, An Appealing Option? The Debate about 
an ICSID Appellate Structure, 57 Essays in Transnat’l Econ. L. 15 (2006); But see also supra 
note 15 (proposing that the whole process including appeals to be limited to 2 years). 
 71 See supra note 70, at 15-16. 
 72 See e.g. supra note 6, at art. 9.12-10.12; see supra note 8, at art. 12.14-13.14; see supra 
note 10, at art. 8.27.12. 
 73 Contracting parties are responsible for the constitution, maintenance and monitoring of 
bilateral courts and appellate proceedings. They are also required to maintain pre-court 
proceedings such as amicable resolution and mediation proceedings. See e.g. supra note 6, at 
art. 2-3, 9-10, 13, 26. 
 74 See supra note 35. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See supra note 34, at 17-18; see also note 35, at 5. 
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should not be discounted. These benefits, once materialized and expanded, 
would arguably address some of the core concerns over international 
investment dispute settlement proceedings – namely, strengthening 
legitimacy for an international dispute settlement proceedings that directly 
affects the policy space of a government.77 The benefits notwithstanding, 
there is also the practical burden of the logistics aspect to be carefully 
contemplated in advance. 
For instance, financial burden is an important element for contracting 
parties of IIAs in any robust participation in IIAs.78 The cost of maintaining 
a standing court (or courts) can also be substantial. As judges of a court of 
the first instance and an appellate court are supposed to be employed on a 
full-time basis or at least are required to refrain from taking work that may 
raise a conflict of interest, they need to be compensated accordingly.79 The 
EU proposal suggests a fixed retainer fee each month coupled with a per diem 
for each day spent on a specific case.80 Based on this formula, the retainer 
fees alone for the judges for a year may amount to almost one million 
dollars.81 This is just the retainer fee and the amount may go up rapidly if a 
specific case is assigned to judges.82 What further complicates this formula 
is that this cost is for just one set of courts. If multiple sets of courts are 
adopted through as many IIAs, reflecting the fragmented bilateral system of 
today’s IIAs, the total cost for the maintenance and operation of the courts 
for the contracting parties can rise dramatically. The increased financial 
burden as a result of the introduction of courts and appellate tribunals should 
affect all contracting parties of IIAs. Nonetheless, all things being equal, the 
increased financial burden is likely to cause a disproportionate impact on 
certain states such as developing states or least developed countries 
(“LDCs”).83 As such, in formulating a prospective court system as a reform 
of the current ISDS proceedings, the new system’s potential to dramatically 
                                                          
 77 See supra note 37, at 396-397. 
 78 See supra note 35, at paras. 52-57. As for the WTO aspect of a similar issue, see World 
Trade Organization, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Ronald Saborio Soto, TN/DS/26 
(“Report by Chairman 26”), at 8, 72; World Trade Organization, Report by the Chairman, 
Ambassador Ronald Saborio Soto, TN/DS/27 (“Report by Chairman 27”), at 11. 
 79 See supra note 66; see supra note 13; see supra note 35, at para. 56. 
 80 See supra note 6, at art. 9.12. 
 81 It is estimated that the average cost of tribunals are approximately USD 500,000-
1,000,000 and the typical lawyers’ fees for the respondents are approximately USD 1-2 million 
on average (2005 UNCTAD data). Other data also suggest the cost of US$ 4 million per side 
in investment arbitrations (2012 OECD data). See Susan D. Franck, Trend in Investment 
Treaty Disputes: Myth, Reality and Cost (“Trend in Investment Treaty Disputes”), 
presentation at the 2013 APEC FTAAP Capacity Building Workshop, hosted by the APEC, 
held in Seoul, Korea on Nov. 7-8, 2013. 
 82 See e.g. supra note 6, at art. 9.12-10.12; see supra note 8, at art. 12.1413.14; see supra 
note 10, at art. 8.27.12. 
 83 See John Kingery, Commentary: Operation of Dispute Settlement Panels, 31 L. & Pol’y 
Int’l Bus. 667 (2000). 
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increase the financial burden for contracting parties should be considered.84 
Proposals should not turn a blind eye to the financial hurdles that these states 
have to face. 
In addition, in a bilateral investment court proposal, contracting parties 
are supposed to appoint multiple sets of judges for multiple courts under 
various IIAs. Finding qualified individuals for the position of judges for 
many sets of courts may be difficult, as individuals may not be willing to 
commit fully to a six-year term during which they will not be able to act as 
counsel or expert witness in any investment dispute.85 This reality presents 
another logistical challenge of securing and commissioning reliable experts 
as judges. Recent ISDS proceedings have underscored the chronic problem 
of a lack of human resources for many states.86 Under these circumstances, a 
possibility is presented that some states may find it difficult to find their own 
national experts to constitute prospective rosters of or conduct the 
                                                          
 84 In a similar vein, arguments can be made that the courts system may also increase total 
costs for ISDS proceedings in general. The inclusion of new procedural steps for standing 
courts, such as interim decisions, third-party intervention, transparency requirements and 
appellate mechanism, may also complicate and prolong the entire dispute settlement 
proceedings. Of course, efficient management of a specific case by a court may shorten the 
entire timeframe of the case, but the addition of further procedural steps and their elaboration 
in the provisions, which seems inevitable for a standing court, may sometimes lengthen and 
complicate the proceedings. These changes may then lead to an increase of the total cost for 
the disputing parties. It is no secret that the present ISDS proceedings require commitment of 
a significant amount of funds. It is estimated that the average cost of tribunals are 
approximately USD 500,000-1,000,000 and the typical lawyers’ fees for the respondents are 
approximately USD 1-2 million on average (2005 UNCTAD data). Another data also suggests 
the cost of US$ 4 million per side in investment arbitrations (2012 OECD data). See Susan 
Franck, “Trend in Investment Treaty Disputes”, supra note 81. Consequently, some of the 
responding states face significant difficulty in financing their legal defense before reviewing 
arbitration tribunals with the assistance and advice of private law firms. See Mathew Hodgson, 
Costs in Investme-nt Treaty Arbitration: The Case for Reform, in Jean E. Kalicki & Anna 
Joubin-Bret eds., Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 
21st Century (Brill Nijhoff, 2015), at 748-749. For the case in trade disputes under the WTO, 
see Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing 
Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, in Towards a Development-
Supportive Dispute Settlement System in the WTO, International Center for Trade and 
Sustainable Development (2008), at 16. In this new landscape of standing courts, states are 
more likely to have to bear increased budgetary and financial burden. 
 85 See supra note 6, at art. 11.1; see supra note 28, at 370. 
 86 In WTO litigation, it is not surprising that developing states find themselves in a 
difficult position in terms of securing domestic experts and professionals in this field. See 
supra note 84, at 9; Joseph A. Conti, Producing Legitimacy at the World Trade Organization: 
The Role of Expertise and Legal Capacity, 8 Soc. Econ. Rev. 135, 139 (2010). Outsourcing is 
always an option under the new scheme of a standing court, but it may further increase a 
financial burden, as indicated above. See Conti, at 143. At the same time, regardless of the 
possibilities of outsourcing, government officials of the respondent states are required to be 
conversant with the development of key jurisprudence of international investment law, which 
may be elusive under the current circumstances of developing states. World Trade 
Organization, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 11. Developing Countries 
in WTO Dispute Settlement. 
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appointment of judges to serve in prospective courts.87 As all investment 
disputes carry significant policy and monetary implications, all contracting 
parties may prefer to use judges of their own nationalities.88 According to 
recent proposals, both parties of an IIA are supposed to appoint the same 
number of judges for the court, either for the court of first instance or an 
appellate court.89 This scheme may work for an IIA between two similarly 
situated contracting parties such as the United States and the EU, who have 
similar pools of talents and experts.90 The two countries may appoint judges 
of their own nationalities, so that they can ensure a system where the views 
of both parties are adequately reflected in the decision making process as 
presumed in the design of the new scheme. 91  In an IIA between states 
differently situated, however, one party may find it difficult to appoint judges 
of its own nationality.92 
A proposed bilateral investment court idea is basically premised on the 
notion that professionals with top-notch expertise in investment law can be 
appointed on a virtually full-time basis. It is also based on the notion that 
both contacting parties of an IIA will have the same opportunity 
quantitatively and qualitatively. It is critical, therefore, that standing courts 
are formulated in a way that ensures the validity of these assumptions.93 
D. Compatible with General Direction of International Investment Law 
It should be also noted that the investment court proposal is generally in 
line with the current trend and future direction of international investment 
law. The emerging consensus of the international community arguably 
indicates that the court system is the right direction for the development of 
the international investment law. 94  In essence, proposals to introduce 
international investment courts, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, aim to 
pursue enhanced “legitimatization” of the ISDS proceedings in a global 
community considering increasing concern over the proceedings. 
By way of example, a standing court is compatible with a new trend of 
international investment dispute settlement proceedings: enhancement of the 
proceedings’ transparency. 95  Shedding the conventional notion of strict 
                                                          
 87 See supra note 83, at 667. 
 88 This is observed in the case of Vietnam in the creation and operation of an investment 
court under the EU-Vietnam FTA. 
 89 See European Commission, “TTIP draft text on investment”, supra note 6, at art. 9.2-
10.2. 
 90 See id. at art. 9.4-10.7. 
 91 See id. at art. 9.6-10.2. 
 92 See e.g., supra note 8, at art. 23. 
 93 One could argue that ‘capacity building’ should be a critical component of the recent 
discussion of standing courts proposals in ISDS proceedings. 
 94 See supra note 34, at 11, 93. 
 95 See supra note 4. For similar discussions in the WTO DSU negotiation reform, see 
World Trade Organization, Further Contribution of the United States to the Improvement of 
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confidentiality,96 IIAs are now actively adopting transparency provisions of 
various types for their ISDS proceedings.97 These transparency provisions of 
IIAs include two main elements: (i) opening hearings to the general public, 
and (ii) allowing public access to Parties’ submissions. Proponents have 
argued that the enhanced transparency of the ISDS proceedings could 
contribute to greater public confidence in the dispute settlement 
mechanism. 98  As arbitration has been traditionally based upon the 
confidentiality of the proceedings, replacing this with a permanent court 
would arguably support and deepen the transparency trend in ISDS 
proceedings at the moment. 99  Likewise, recent discussion on the 
strengthening of ethics rules for arbitrators100 are also in line with the general 
direction of the court proposal. A standing court requires stringent rules for 
the regulation of ethics issues for its full-time or exclusively-assigned 
members.101 
The long-standing proposal for the introduction of the appellate 
mechanism in ISDS proceedings is also compatible with the idea of having 
standing courts in place.102 Unlike arbitration, which by nature presupposes 
an ad hoc, one-time adjudicative process, a standing court more naturally 
fosters the idea of an appellate mechanism.103 A strong argument can be 
made that an appellate mechanism, if properly established, will be able to 
address some of the key concerns harbored by stakeholders in the ISDS 
proceedings.104 Most importantly, an appellate mechanism will be able to 
facilitate and foster “rule of law” in the ISDS proceedings by accumulating 
and spreading consistent jurisprudence in the international community.105 
Recent development of these individual items in the circle of 
international investment law arguably supports the proposition that proposals 
of international investment courts are proceeding in the right direction. 
                                                          
the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO related to Transparency-Revised Legal 
Drafting (2006), at 1; World Trade Organization, Contribution of the United States to the 
Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO related to Transparency 
(“US Contribution to Transparency 13”) (Aug. 2002), at 1; World Trade Organization, 
Contribution of the European Communities and Its Member States (“EC Contribution 1”), at 
6-7. 
 96 A similar trend is also observed in the WTO. See supra note 95, at 1-2; see supra note 
95, at 1; see supra note 95, at 6-7. 
 97 See supra note 6, at art. 18; see supra note 56, at art. 9.24; see supra note 8, at art. 20; 
see supra note 9, at ANNEX 9-G; see supra note 10 at art. 8.36. 
 98 UNCTAD, Transparency, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements II, U.N. (2012), at 48. 
 99 See supra note 66. 
 100 See supra note 6, at art. 11; see supra note 8, at art. 14; see also CETA, ch. 8, art. 8.30. 
 101 See supra note 35, at paras. 19, 28, 33. 
 102 See supra note 66, at 6-9. 
 103 See supra note 35, at para. 11. 
 104 Id., at paras. 5, 34 
 105 See supra note 26, at 561; see also supra note 64, at 11. 
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Many, if not all, of the reform proposals could be subsumed by the 
introduction and operation of courts. 
IV. INVESTMENT COURT PROPOSALS’ IMPLICATION FOR 
FRAGMENTATION 
On balance, proposals for international investment courts can be 
evaluated as largely heading in the right direction by reflecting increasing 
concerns and demands of many states and domestic constituencies. 106 
Properly constituted and meticulously operated, these courts will be able to 
address some of the core problems of investment dispute settlement 
proceedings that have been identified thus far. Most importantly, a permanent 
court regime with a set of full-time judges is expected to enhance the 
legitimacy of the proceedings and their outcomes.107 In many respects, this 
idea appears to represent a turning point of the ISDS regime in the global 
community since its inception in 1966.108 At the same time, considering the 
current proposals and prior experience in this area, it is probable that the 
experiment of the new investment court system will start with a “bilateral” 
investment court approach at least in the early stage of the implementation, 
setting the tone ultimately for a multilateral court.109 The interim period may 
take several years, or possibly longer.110  Indeed, the interim period may 
become permanent if negotiations for a multilateral court fail to reach 
consensus.111 Even if a consensus is reached and a convention adopted, the 
process of ratification and entry into force may take a long time, suffering 
from the low accession rates, at least initially, as seen in the example of the 
Mauritius Convention. 
The emerging question, then, is what a bilateral investment court system 
would mean to the current international investment law regime and ISDS 
proceedings. More specifically, would such a bilateral court scheme help 
alleviate current problems or worsen them? As noted above, the ultimate 
establishment of a multilateral investment court through a U.N.-sponsored 
convention will certainly alleviate these problems. More ambitiously, a 
WTO-like international organization with a WTO Agreements-comparable 
multilateral regime equipped with a WTO DSB-type centralized, multilateral 
dispute settlement mechanism will certainly help us resolve these problems. 
At this stage, momentum is now being created to aim for the easier objective 
                                                          
 106 See supra note 34, at 11, 93. 
 107 See supra note 66, at 4-8. 
 108 Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret (eds.), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement System, Brill Nijhoff (Leiden, The Netherlands, 2015), at 255. 
 109 See e.g. supra note 6, Article 12; European Commission, “EU-Vietnam FTA”, supra 
note 8, Article 18; European Commission, “CETA”, supra note 10, at art. 8.29. 
 110 See supra note 12, at 182. 
 111 See Bradly J. Condon, Does International Economic Law Impose a Duty to Negotiate?, 
17 Chinese J. of Int’l L., 73, 103 (2018) (indicating that sometimes states have less or different 
incentives in participating in negotiations of a treaty or its successful conclusion.) 
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of the two – establishing a multilateral court that has jurisdiction over 
investment disputes without creating a multilateral regime with a multilateral 
agreement, a task that is more difficult and elusive.112 
Even this easier version of a multilateral scheme with a multilateral 
court may take a long time to grow into a global court by absorbing existing 
investment arbitration regimes and new bilateral courts. Unless and until 
such a multilateral court operates actively in the future, ISDS proceedings 
that states and investors will have to utilize include the present system of 
arbitration and budding bilateral investment courts. The more immediate 
question, then, is what we can expect from this period – from now to the full 
operation of a multilateral investment court with the accession of an absolute 
majority of states. 
A. The Problem of Fragmentation 
It is suggested that one of the core characteristics of present 
international investment law is the inherently fragmented nature of its regime 
in which 3,367 individual IIAs co-exist and create legally binding norms on 
a (mostly) bilateral basis.113 There is no multilateral agreement supervising 
or coordinating these numerous IIAs and the outer parameters of these IIAs 
are not necessarily adjusted to avoid conflict or inconsistency.114 Further, no 
international organization yet exists. 115  These traits are juxtaposed with 
international trade law where the WTO, an international organization, 
establishes a single, multilateral regime and provides one set of norms for all 
parties.116 FTAs increasingly raise concerns of a “spaghetti bowl” effect but 
they are still operating in and monitored by the WTO regime.117 
As a legal regime, such a highly fragmented system creates a problem 
                                                          
 112 See supra note 34, at 27-30; see supra note 35, at paras. 63-66. 
 113 See supra note 66, at 9; see supra note 34, at 12-13. 
 114 See supra note 12, at 141 & ch. III. 
 115 ICSID retains standing facilities and human resources in Washington, D.C. As a 
‘center’, it facilitates or otherwise supports state parties of the ICSID Convention in resolving 
their investment disputes with foreign investors. It does not however possess rights and 
obligations as a subject of international law, such as the United Nations or the WTO, to 
monitor and enforce constituting treaties. ICSID is thus not an international organization 
within the meaning of international law. 
 116 Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos? Foreign Investment Law as a Complex Adaptive 
System, How it Emerged and How it can be Reformed, 29 ICSID Rev. Foreign Inv. L. J. 378 
(2014) (stating “first, unlike, for example, UN, WTO or EU law, FIL is not organized around 
a single multilateral treaty or central international organization. Instead, FIL is heavily 
decentralized and composed of a multitude of bilateral, regional and multilateral treaties 
(BITs, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), FTAs, the European Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT) etc.) … and a diversity of arbitral institutions … and domestic courts and 
investment agencies, without central authority”). 
 117 There has been 124 RTAs concluded during the GATT period and since the 
establishment of the WTO, more than 400 RTAs have been notified with conclusion. The list 
of all the current RTAs notified to the WTO can be found in the WTO website as the following: 
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx (last visited on Apr. 14, 2018). 
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of fragmented norms and a fragmented dispute settlement system.118 The 
same issues are sometimes resolved differently. 119  Investment arbitration 
tribunals adopt different approaches and render non-identical jurisprudence 
for key issues of IIAs.120 Fragmented norms and dispute settlement systems 
producing non-harmonized decisions and awards have been regarded as one 
of the major sources of fostering challenges to the legitimacy of the entire 
system. 121  The absence of an appellate system in ISDS proceedings has 
further confounded the situation.122 Having seen evidence of varying or even 
conflicting jurisprudence, aggrieved parties in disputes, unsurprisingly, tend 
to blame the system. Even if they reluctantly accept their legal 
responsibilities, they may not have been necessarily persuaded by the 
rationale and outcome of their arbitration tribunals. In theory, different 
outcomes and awards are inevitable as governing laws (i.e., IIAs in question) 
differ. Nonetheless, from the perspective of disputing parties, non-identical 
or non-harmonized jurisprudence on essentially the same issue (such as the 
definition of investment or the scope of necessity defense 123 ) acts as a 
                                                          
 118 Stephen W. Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking, 
12 German Law Journal 1093, (2012); Stephen W. Schill, From Sources to Discourse: 
Investment Treaty Jurisprudence as the New Custom? (2011); see also supra note 43, at 126, 
128; Karl P. Sauvant & Federico Ortino, Improving on the International Investment Law and 
Policy Regime: Options for the Future, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2013), at 27-
32. 
 119 See supra note 35, at paras. 33, 68. 
 120 By way of example, the definition of “investment” has been inconsistent among 
investment tribunals examining this issue. Compare Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade 
S.p.A. v. Morocco, ICSID Case No ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction of July 23, 2001; Joy 
Mining Machinery Limited v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Decision on Jurisdiction of 
July 23, 2001; Jan de Nul N.V. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Decision on Jurisdiction 
of June 16, 2006 with Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/7, Decision on Annulment of November 1, 2006; L.E.S.I. S.p.A. et ASTALDI S.p.A. 
v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Decision of July 12, 2006; Siemens, A.G. v. Argentina, 
ICSID Case No ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction of August 3, 2004; Malaysian Historical 
Salvors SDN BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for 
Annulment of April 16, 2009. Similar inconsistences are also found with respect to the 
application of MFN provisions. For instance, compare tribunals’ position in Maffezini v. 
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award of Nov. 13, 2000; Siemens v. Argentina, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction with other tribunals’ position in Renta 4 
S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, Arb. Inst. of Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Award 
on Preliminary Objections (Mar. 20, 2009); Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence of Feb. 12, 2007. These 
inconsistences and sometimes contradictory positions are not necessarily stemming from the 
fact that different BIT texts are being interpreted. Rather, they arguably show the fundamental 
differences of tribunals in approaching these key terms contained in the BITs. See supra note 
66, at 1. 
 121 Catherine Yannaca-Small, Part II, Chapter 7, Improving the System of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement: An Overview, in International Investment Perspectives, OECD (2006), at 
185-186. 
 122 Id., at 189. 
 123 The divergent views and incoherent decisions in recent arbitration awards regarding the 
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hindrance to the ready and whole-hearted acceptance of the outcome of an 
investment arbitration.124 
More importantly, different interpretations and dispositions have 
rendered the accumulation of predictable jurisprudence elusive. 125 
Enhancing predictability is the core contribution of any international dispute 
settlement mechanism.126 Non-identical or non-harmonized jurisprudence in 
international investment law has apparently lowered the level of 
predictability in the international community.127 Arguably, this situation has 
not helped the “rule of law” take a deeper root in international investment 
law.128 It may instead invite continuing criticism from interest groups of 
individual states. As such, any prospective reform effort in the international 
community should be able to address this problem or at least not worsen the 
current situation. Should a proposed reform be deemed unable to address the 
problem, a cautious approach is warranted. The proposals for international 
investment courts should also be evaluated from the same perspective. 
B. Enhancing Legitimacy through Standing Courts 
Noting the starting points of the investment court proposals in the first 
place, standing courts under IIAs should help enhance the legitimacy of the 
ISDS proceedings and their outcomes.129 If circumstances under the new 
terrain of standing courts still permit aggrieved parties and/or outside 
observers to raise serious challenges of legitimacy, the merit of the reform 
will be questioned and the associated costs and burden will hardly be 
justified. Current concerns and controversies will continue to intensify, and 
the function of ISDS proceedings as an effective dispute settlement 
mechanism will be undermined.130 In other words, the court proposal should 
be more than an experiment that may or may not address the current problem. 
It needs to show the probability, if not the certainty, of addressing the 
problem.131 Viewed from this perspective, the court system should be able to 
                                                          
necessity defense under Article 25 of 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility has 
raised concern on the part of stakeholders of international investment law. See supra note 12, 
at 141 & Chapter III. 
 124 See supra note 34, at 13. 
 125 Mark Wu, The Scope and Limits of Trade’s Influence in Shaping the Evolving 
International Investment Regime, in Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn, Jorge E. Vinuales 
(eds.), The Foundations of International Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014), at 189; Doug Jones, Investor-State Arbitration: The 
Problem of Inconsistency and Conflicting Awards, Presentation at German-American 
Lawyers’ Association Practice Group Day, (Frankfurt, March 2011), at 2-5. 
 126 See supra note 35, at 5-6. 
 127 See supra note 126, at 189; see also supra note 126, at 2-5. 
 128 Id.; See Franck, “Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration”, supra note 26. 
 129 See supra note 37, at 396-397. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See supra note 4, at 1-2; See supra note 4 (“Despite its visionary nature, the proposed 
court system suffers from two structural weaknesses that reduce its suitability as a global 
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enhance legitimacy, and enhance it significantly so that the increased 
financial and logistical burden is justified.132 
This basic objective of legitimacy enhancement should permeate the 
entire discussion of international investment courts, including its 
establishment, composition, and operation. The initiation of this particular 
discussion of ISDS reform has not been triggered by a desire to adopt a better 
dispute settlement system in abstract or in theory; rather, the triggering point 
was creating a more legitimate dispute settlement regime in international 
investment law.133 How much can be achieved on this front from a variety of 
proposals, as negotiations are in full swing, warrants the continued attention 
of states and governments. Proposals and counter-proposals would have to 
be continuously assessed against this yardstick. 
C. Multiple Investment Courts in Respective IIAs – Curing or Fixating 
Fragmentation? 
Consideration of these issues arguably causes scholars and observers to 
have some critical views of a bilateral investment court system as it spreads 
across the negotiating tables of IIAs. Under this scheme and as it is being 
negotiated, different IIAs will have individual and independent investment 
courts including appellate proceedings. As it currently stands, there will not 
be an apparatus or entity that coordinates among these separate, individual, 
and independent investment courts.134 Each individual court is authorized 
and required to make its own decisions and issue judgments, independent of 
other investment courts.135 All things being equal, different interpretations 
and inconsistent jurisprudence among different investment courts will 
probably be as common as they are at present.136 
i. Possibility of Firmer and Deeper Fragmentation 
Once the basic scheme of bilateral investment courts is fully 
implemented through ongoing IIA negotiations, the international community 
may end up seeing multiple courts equipped with full-time judges and 
procedural bulwarks as opposed to the more flexible arbitration tribunals of 
today. Examined in clinical isolation, this certainly represents an 
improvement and development: more structured and systematized dispute 
settlement mechanism subject to the possibility of an appellate review with 
                                                          
model, namely its bilateral set-up and its relationship with domestic courts.”). 
 132 See supra note 34, at 17-18 
 133 Id. Scholars also point out that the more fundamental problem of incoherent awards in 
investment arbitration is not the status of confusing jurisprudence per se, but rather the 
‘perception’ from stakeholders that this dispute settlement mechanism does not necessarily 
ensure a just outcome. See supra note 12, at 141. 
 134 See supra note 34, at 12-13. 
 135 See OECD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Public Consultation: 16 May – 9 July 
2012, OECD Investment Division (2012), at 51-62. 
 136 See supra note 34, at 12. 
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tighter control of adjudicators’ conflict of interest certainly constitutes an 
evolution of the system. As a matter of fact, what deserves careful attention 
now is this very structure and effectiveness. The transition from flexible 
arbitration to rigid, procedural-rule-based adjudication would mean more 
separation and individuality: an arbitration-turned-court in a respective IIA 
would now have more fortified walls and castles of its own. As long as 
separation walls exist in international investment law, which is unfortunately 
the current situation, strengthening the walls by adding more bolts, nuts, and 
timber would increase the level of individuality. This is an awkward 
development if the ultimate objective of the international community is to 
break down these walls and collapse them into a single castle – i.e., 
multilateralism – or at least lower the walls and facilitate interaction above 
the walls so that constituents in each castle can expect a similar outcome from 
similar disputes – i.e., a multilateral court even in multiple IIAs. 
If anything, considering the more prestigious status and higher 
expectation accorded to a court, a transformation from an ad hoc arbitration 
tribunal to a standing court with full-time judges may further fortify the 
individual castles of IIAs. It may arguably be more difficult for one court to 
subscribe to the view of another. Voluntary adjustment is currently difficult 
but will be more so in the new system. This may be another instance of 
claiming judicial sovereignty and independence. From the systemic point of 
view, the multiplication and coexistence of more individualized and effective 
adjudicating entities in the absence of a coordination mechanism may end up 
producing further fragmentation. 137  Confusion may be inevitable and 
legitimacy challenges may not subside. 
As such, a plausible argument can be made that a bilateral investment 
court approach may end up further fixating the bulwark of respective IIAs, 
which will probably deepen or at least maintain the current fragmentation of 
international investment law. 138  One of the fundamental problems of 
international investment law would remain unaddressed.139 On the contrary, 
firmer and deeper integration through further bilateralization may make the 
                                                          
 137 Furthermore, recent IIAs are experimenting new dispute settlement proceedings in 
addition to existing ISDS proceedings. See supra note 33, ch. III.A. As such, even in the 
absence of new standing courts, more dispute settlement proceedings are already emerging in 
respective IIAs, possibly with different procedural rules and outcomes, a recipe for more 
fragmentation in the long run. 
 138 See supra note 4. (“The creation of a permanent investment court system with respect 
to a given agreement, such as the TTIP Tribunal, would eliminate inconsistent interpretations 
of that agreement. But such an approach could not address treaty-overarching 
inconsistencies—that is, inconsistencies in interpretation or application of corresponding 
provisions in different treaties. Instead, if permanent investment courts were to proliferate on 
a bilateral basis as a result of the Commission’s approach, inconsistencies in the approaches 
of different investment courts to essentially identical issues and treaty provisions are likely to 
persist. Only the creation of a multilateral investment court would be able to ensure cross-
treaty consistency and predictability in international investment law more generally.”). 
 139 See supra note 32, at 498. 
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current multilateralization effort more elusive and precarious. It is true that 
this period of bilateral courts will be brief and temporary. It is also true that 
the interim period will continue longer than originally hoped for and will be 
a fait accompli that states will have to live with. Continued failure to secure 
a multilateral solution in international investment law indicates that the latter 
is still a valid assumption in the absence of a remarkable breakthrough. 
In addition, creating multiple investment courts will harm the 
effectiveness of the policy, since it will be difficult to manage different courts 
all at once while ensuring the uniformity of court decisions.140 In short, the 
most important problem is that it can further balkanize international 
investment law or deepen fragmentation of existing investment agreements. 
ii. Possibility of Another Fragmentation Layer 
Further complicating the situation is that the bilateral court system 
comes into existence in addition to the existing system of investment 
arbitration. In other words, the idea means that the present investment 
arbitration and a new bilateral court system will co-exist until a final 
resolution is reached through a multilateral court regime with the successful 
subscription of the critical majority of states. As noted above, it will take a 
significant amount of time, if it is at all possible, before a multilateral solution 
is found and applied. This reality would mean that under the bilateral court 
regime, the ISDS proceedings will experience further fragmentation in itself, 
with some disputes following the present arbitration system while newer ones 
adopt the new court system. 
Therefore, the ISDS proceedings themselves are going to take 
bifurcated paths. Some countries opposing the court regime will continue to 
adopt the present arbitration system while those in favor will start to adopt 
the court option. The international community will encounter two blocks of 
ISDS proceedings. Even for the states in favor of the court option, two blocks 
of ISDS proceedings will co-exist and compete internally: existing IIAs’ 
ISDS proceedings cannot be replaced unless a multinational solution is 
agreed upon, and even then they can only be replaced vis-à-vis another 
contracting party that is also supportive of the idea. It follows that even those 
eager to adopt the court system will have to simultaneously handle the 
present arbitration system as well. The EU member states will have to juggle 
both the court system and arbitration system in their own IIAs. Further 
fragmentation even within the ISDS proceedings and for the same state seems 
inevitable under the circumstances. This phenomenon will thus not help 
address the fragmented nature of international investment law. 
                                                          
 140 European Commission, Convention to Establish a Multilateral Court on Investment 
(2016); see supra note 28, at 384 (stating that “a situation in which each FTA with an 
investment chapter and each International Investment Agreement (IIA) have their own ICS 
could lead to even greater fragmentation and unpredictability than the current ad hoc 
arbitration system”). 
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More concerning is the possible reaction from the general public to this 
dual ISDS environment, specifically the public’s perception of the arbitration 
outcome (awards) if a court system is adopted by some states and explained 
as a new guardian of rule of law discrediting the old regime of arbitration. 
The chances are that critics will probably find an easy prey in these awards. 
Criticism of investment arbitration will further intensify, which will threaten 
to further undermine the legitimacy of these proceedings, the very objective 
that initiated the discussion in the first place. 
If at all possible, it would be prudent to find a way to avoid dual ISDS 
proceedings. Or at least, dual ISDS proceedings’ unintended consequences 
should be carefully contemplated in the discussion of the bilateral investment 
court proposals. The price of an experimental adoption of bilateral courts in 
hopeful anticipation of a multilateral court may prove to be high. 
V. FUTURE COURT OF ACTION – SUSPENSION OF BILATERAL 
COURT OPTION AND PROMPT ESTABLISHMENT OF SINGLE 
MULTILATERAL COURT 
Consensus is building fast in the global arena that further elaboration 
and “courtfication” of ISDS proceedings will be able to address core 
concerns over and challenges against them by enhancing the legitimacy of 
the proceedings. Strengthened rule of law in international investment dispute 
settlement through courtification will deepen public trust in the mechanism 
and its outcome. Consequently, the general direction of the current reform 
proposals tabled in some of the recent IIAs should be commended and the 
momentum should be preserved. With that said, however, discussions of 
reforms should also start by recognizing reality and heeding prior experience, 
mindful of how proposed reforms may (not) change, for better or worse, the 
existing dynamics of the dispute settlement system. A worst-case scenario is 
when a half-baked reform introduces further confusion and raises new 
concerns. Side effects should not outweigh the intended benefit. If some 
unintended side effects are expected, it would be wise to guard against them. 
The proposed introduction of standing bilateral courts within the larger 
picture of reform discussions for ISDS proceedings is likely to cause an 
unintended effect of further deepening the fragmentation problem and 
putting the system into a new spiral of legitimacy challenges in the post-
reform landscape. It is possible that the period facing such consequences will 
be brief. It is also possible, and perhaps more probable, that the period will 
be much longer than expected. Worse yet, it cannot be ruled out that future 
negotiations to agree upon a multilateral court may fail to deliver.141 Bilateral 
                                                          
 141 In public international law in general, and in international economic law in particular, 
such as WTO Agreements, there is no specific obligation to ‘negotiate’ or to produce tangible 
outcome through such negotiation. (“In a world where the incentives to negotiate vary with 
the issue and there are few instances in which there is an institutional framework that requires 
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court proposals should be evaluated with these possibilities in mind.142 
In contemplating major reforms of the current system, it is essential for 
the states concerned to be apprised of systemic implications.143 After all, 
ISDS proceedings are one of the core elements of an IIA, and facilitating 
adequate utilization of the proceedings by states for their defense in 
investment disputes is indeed critical for the long-term sustainability of the 
international investment regime.144 In contemplation of these aspects, this 
Section offers some guidelines for future discussions of this particular matter. 
A. Multi-dimensional Consideration of Systemic Implications 
As they currently stand, discussions on ISDS proceedings reform so far 
seem to have been rather compartmentalized and particularized. Individual 
topics are being discussed on their own, with associated merits and demerits. 
From the perspective of the overall operation of ISDS proceedings, however, 
individual topics are interconnected and intertwined with one another.145 The 
establishment of standing bilateral courts is not merely about the benefit of 
having courts to resolve investment disputes, but also about what, if any, 
practical and legal implications will flow from such courts. Consequently, a 
holistic perspective examining all these individual issues horizontally and 
comprehensively is in order; such a perspective could offer a proper picture 
for reform proposals being tabled and ensure a balanced outcome. 
For instance, the creation of standing bilateral courts raises an 
immediate question of how to deal with a new tendency in IIAs of 
strengthening and expanding the role of Joint Committees or Joint 
Commissions in IIAs. 146  Recent IIAs now entrust these committees and 
                                                          
to negotiate. To insist on the existence of a duty to negotiate in these circumstances, absent 
clear treaty text, is ‘to confuse the desirable with the mandatory’”). See supra note 111, at 73, 
103. See also supra note 111, at para. 65. As such, a prospective treaty proposal based on mere 
expectation of possible initiation of negotiation and most notably, successful conclusion of 
such negotiation may not be able to operate as a guarantee for a particular outcome or for a 
smooth transition. This understanding would arguably counsel against rushing to a hasty 
conclusion on future contingencies. 
 142 See id. 
 143 See supra note 12, at ch. II. C. (pointing out international investment law constitutes a 
system on its own accord and also operates within the system of public international law.) 
 144 This notion can be inferred from similar discussions on the WTO system. See John H. 
Jackson, Perceptions About the WTO Trade Institutions, 1 World Trade Rev. 101, 111 (2002); 
Andrea Greisberger, Note: Enhancing the Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization: Why 
the United States and the European Union Should Support the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, 
37 Vanderbilt J. of Transnat’l L. 834, (2004). 
 145 See supra note 76, at 9. 
 146 See e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Korea and 
the Government of Australia (“Korea-Australia FTA:) (Apr. 2014), (entered into force on Dec. 
12, 2014), at art. 21.3.2; Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (“Japan-Australia 
EPA”), (Jul. 8, 2014), (entered into force on Jan. 15, 2015), at art. 1.13.2; Agreement Between 
the Government of Canada and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (“China-Canada BIT”), (Sep. 9, 2012), 
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commissions with more substantive and meaningful roles as IIA-monitoring 
bodies, including most notably the authority to issue legally binding 
interpretations that bind investment arbitration tribunals. 147  This is a 
countermeasure on the part of states to protect themselves against 
unpredictable decisions and awards from investment arbitrations under 
IIAs.148 The WTO also has a similar mechanism of binding interpretation of 
the Ministerial Council in the Marrakesh Agreement,149 but it is not directly 
related to a specific case pending at a panel or the Appellate Body. The 
WTO’s binding interpretation is closer to a clarification of the terms of the 
agreements short of amendment; it does not allow the Ministerial Council, or 
any other entity for that matter, to direct how a panel or the Appellate Body 
should interpret a particular provision. 150  Binding interpretation by Joint 
Committees or Commissions directly bind investment arbitration tribunals in 
specific cases, which differentiates this authority in an IIA from that of the 
WTO. 
Now, with the introduction of an independent judiciary in an IIA with 
designation as a court, it is not clear whether this type of a monitoring body 
of government officials is or should be eligible to issue an interpretation that 
binds the “court” in a specific case. Interpretation is a critical task for any 
international adjudicative body. It is the interpretation of specific terms that 
ultimately determines the outcome of a dispute as codified in Article 31 of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As such, allowing an 
outside political entity to issue (binding) interpretations would arguably 
amount to usurping the core authority of an international judicial entity. It 
can be compared to the executive branch dictating the judiciary branch in a 
domestic context, upending the separation of powers or infringing upon the 
independence and integrity of the judiciary. The advent of the bilateral court 
system will require adjustment and/or shrinkage of the authority of these 
committees and commissions. 
Likewise, in the context of a denial of justice claim, standing bilateral 
investment courts carry the potential of further intensifying the concern over 
judicial sovereignty infringement within domestic constituencies of 
contracting parties of IIAs. A standing bilateral investment court reviewing 
the decision or judgment of a domestic court with the operation of a provision 
of an IIA 151  may strengthen the (erroneous) view of the public that an 
                                                          
at art. 20, 33.3; Agreement among the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic 
of Korea and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion, 
Facilitation and Protection of Investment (“Korea-China-Japan TIT”), (May 2012), at art. 24. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See, e.g., The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report 142: Treaty 
Tabled on 13 May 2014—Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and 
the Government of the Republic of Korea (Sept. 2014), at 27. 
 149 See supra note 1, at art. IV. 
 150 See id. 
 151 See supra note 34, at 7. 
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international court overrides the domestic court, catering to the claim of 
national sovereignty infringement.152 
In addition, unlike in international investment arbitration, states will not 
be able to select their own judges if they bring a case to the international 
investment court. It is debatable whether states prefer permanent courts over 
arbitration tribunals, as states have historically preferred to exert control over 
the formation of tribunals.153 
At the same time, with respect to the impartiality of decision makers, 
while proponents of international investment courts argue that judges with a 
secure tenure will be impartial, judges may actually be biased towards states. 
For instance, while the draft of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership between the European Union and the United States establishes 
that “judges shall be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond 
doubt,”154 it does not bar government officials from being elected, who can 
be partial towards states.155 
B. Avoiding Unnecessary Complication 
Similarly, in devising a future court mechanism in ISDS proceedings it 
is critical that the new mechanism not cause too much procedural 
complication, nor should it invite further legal complexities in the 
administration of ISDS proceedings and interpretation of the relevant 
provisions of IIAs. The benefits of having standing bilateral courts could 
easily evaporate if the new mechanism somehow leads to more claims and 
disputes relating to newly introduced procedures and intermediate steps for 
proceedings. For example, court proceedings would naturally entail wider 
third-party participation, more enhanced transparency, more expansive 
participation of the general public, further heightened evidentiary rules, and 
                                                          
 152 Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. Penn. 
L. Rev. 171, 225 (2008). (“Among international tribunals, the WTO’s [Appellate Body] is 
arguably the most like domestic courts.”). It is increasingly the case that action and inaction 
of the judiciary become subjects of ISDS proceedings of IIAs. As to the recent ISDS 
proceedings where domestic courts’ decisions and judgments were challenged, see, e.g., 
Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. Ecuador (Mar. 2010); Bosh 
International, Inc, v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11, Award of 25 Oct. 2012; 
Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v. The Republic of Albania, ICSID Case 
No.ARB/07/21, Award of 30 Jul. 2009; White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of 
India, In the Matter of UNCITRAL Arbitration in Singapore, Final Award of 30 Nov. 2011; 
Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AJ)/99/2, Award of 11 
Oct. 2002; Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, SCC Arbitration No. 080/2005, Final 
Award of 26 Mar. 2008; Apotex, Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
UNCT/10/2, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 14 Jun. 2013; Saipem v. Bangladesh, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, Award of 30 Jun. 2009. 
 153 Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 223 Santa 
Clara J. Internat’l L. 251 (2013). 
 154 See supra note 6, at art. 11.1. 
 155 Id.; see also note 6 at art. 11.1; see also supra note 28, at 537-538; see also supra note 
28, at 370. 
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more thorough scrutiny of conflicting interests and backgrounds of 
adjudicators. These new insertions in the procedural rules may, in and of 
themselves, turn out to be the subject of disputes. Flexibility is traded for 
rigidity to introduce courts, and rigid procedural rules can easily become a 
topic of contention between the parties. Furthermore, these procedural rules 
may vary from IIA to IIA as with their substantive provisions, imposing more 
logistical burden on states. 
In devising bilateral investment courts, efforts need to be focused on 
introducing simple and straightforward procedures to the extent that basic 
procedural due process can be maintained. If possible, procedural variations 
among IIAs of the same states can preferably be minimized as much as is 
feasible. Avoiding unnecessary procedural complication will help avoid 
unnecessary disputes. Efforts to solve one problem should not generate 
others. 
C. Systemic Support for Capacity-Building 
A bilateral court scheme also ultimately requires discussions of how to 
financially and logistically support under-privileged states participating in 
the new system. They are now supposed to equally bear the financial and 
logistical burden of creating and maintaining bilateral courts. 156  If these 
states are not able to participate in multiple bilateral investment courts with 
their limited financial and logistical capacity, suggestions need to be made 
how to support these states. Otherwise, the bilateral court would become an 
option available to only a certain group of states. Thus, capacity-building 
programs should be an integral part of the bilateral court discussions between 
two contracting parties of significantly unequal economic development. 
Preferably, such support measures might explore general, systemic 
assistance, independent of specific disputes, that helps foster capacity-
building of underdeveloped contracting parties on a long-term basis.157 An 
experiment adopted by the WTO may provide a meaningful guidance for this 
purpose.158 In the absence of the capacity-building component, the bilateral 
court proposal will be difficult to implement for quite a few states, because 
                                                          
 156 See supra note 6, at art. 9.12-10.12; see supra note 8, at art. 12.14-13.14; see supra note 
10, at art. 8.27.12. These provisions envisage that both parties are supposed to shoulder equal 
financial burden. 
 157 In fact, this concern is already reflected in the present DSU’s Article 27.2. The LDC 
Group and African Group have pointed out during the DSU amendment negotiations that the 
impartiality requirement under Article 27.2 lays unnecessary restraints on offering effective 
assistance to the underprivileged Members and that expert from the Secretariat should play 
the role of counsel for these Members; World Trade Organization, Text for the African Group 
Proposals on Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations, TN/DS/W/42, at 4; World 
Trade Organization, Text for the African Group Proposals on Dispute Settlement 
Understanding Negotiations, TN/DS/W/92, at 2-3. 
 158 See Chad P. Bown & Rachel McCulloch, Developing Countries, Dispute Settlement, 
and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 5168, at 3 (Sept. 
2012). At present, 32 developing countries and 42 LDCs are listed as Members of the ACWL. 
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the bilateral scheme by definition presupposes the creation and maintenance 
of as many courts as IIAs. 
D. Suspension of the Bilateral Court Scheme 
The above three proposals in this section159 are intended to improve and 
fine-tune the bilateral court idea being discussed at the moment. If possible, 
this article submits, it would be more prudent and appropriate to suspend 
bilateral court discussions in various IIAs. These bilateral courts will be 
unable to address the fragmentation problem; if anything, fragmentation will 
likely be further facilitated by these bilateral courts. Different jurisprudence 
and varying interpretations will be as frequent as observed in the present 
arbitration format. States will have to scramble to create and maintain these 
multiple courts, and some states do not possess the financial capacity and/or 
depth of experts to sustain them. 
The problem of the bilateral court scheme is that it will further 
complicate and fragment the existing ISDS proceedings. In other words, 
there will be as many investment courts as IIAs. If pushed to the extreme, 
there will be 3,367 investment courts in the future. If only 10% of the IIAs 
introduce investment courts, the number of total courts will reach over 300. 
Only 1% would mean 30 different, fully-operating courts. Apparently, this is 
not feasible by any account. Few countries, if any, have the resources and 
experts to deal with these courts simultaneously. 
More than anything else, if this is not a final station but merely a way 
station to the final aim of a multilateral court through a convention, the 
benefit from the bilateral courts would be, at best, the experience gained from 
the experiment. This is too high a price to pay in exchange for the possible 
confusion and complications. 
Under these circumstances, a plausible argument can be made to 
suspend the on-going discussion and negotiation of bilateral courts in 
respective IIAs. Instead, time and resources could better be directed at the 
negotiation and preparation of a multilateral court, which will deliver a final 
resolution of the matter at issue. Having states contemplate both bilateral 
courts and a multilateral court at the same time will thinly stretch limited 
human and financial resources, and thus prolong the discussion to ultimately 
introduce a multilateral court. Against this backdrop, this article suggests that 
the current exploration of bilateral schemes be suspended. 
E. Multilateral Mechanism as the Only Alternative 
The above discussion underscores the importance of the prompt 
establishment of a multilateral court. The current court proposals are 
apparently aimed at both bilateral and multilateral courts. These proposals 
                                                          
 159 See sec. V. 
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aim to first establish bilateral courts based on IIAs160 and then, using the 
momentum and experience gained, adopt a multilateral court in the future. 
The bilateral scheme, however, does not provide momentum and will 
probably turn out to be a stumbling block to efficient negotiation of the 
introduction and operation of a multilateral court. In other words, a bilateral 
scheme is not and cannot be an alternative or a stimulant. A multilateral 
scheme is the only alternative that can address the legitimacy problem by 
harmonizing jurisprudence and offering consistent interpretation of IIAs. 
Future efforts should be focused on the prompt initiation and conclusion of 
negotiations to introduce and establish a multilateral court in the global arena. 
If the ISDS reform is urgent, this task of prompt negotiation of a multilateral 
court deserves to be given the highest priority. 
Due to this structural implication, a standing court (or courts) would 
have to be a multilateral one if it is to survive in the long run.161 It is not only 
practical and feasible, but it may also lessen the burden for developing states. 
Thus, a prospective court mechanism should preferably be an entity created 
by a multilateral regime, be it ICSID, OECD, UNCITRAL, or another 
regime. Arguably, this task could be delicate because IIAs are bilateral in 
nature. But if the international community forms a consensus to 
fundamentally reform the ISDS proceedings and introduce a standing court 
(or courts), a tribunal created under the auspices of a multilateral entity or 
within a multilateral regime seems to be better equipped to achieve the 
objective of the system. In order to avoid unnecessary confusion and fallacies 
in the future, discussions of the court system at the moment should also 
contemplate this structural aspect of the issue as well. 
More specifically, a multilateral court can be established by a 
convention which purports to replace contracting parties’ existing ISDS 
proceedings of already concluded IIAs with new proceedings of a 
multilateral court.162 In addition, newly concluded IIAs will be permitted (or 
required) to adopt the new multilateral court mechanism. A multilateral court 
can be a stand-alone entity, or be created under the wings of, or through 
affiliation with, the ICSID, PCA, UNCITRAL or OECD. Under this scheme, 
substantive provisions of IIAs remain as they are today, but their ISDS 
proceedings will discard the existing arbitration scheme and instead 
incorporate the multilateral court scheme.163 As this scheme does not aim to 
harmonize substantive norms, it can be distinguished from the aborted 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”).164 
A more fundamental solution could be found by adopting a MAI-type 
                                                          
 160 See supra note 6, at art. 1. 
 161 See supra note 32, at 403. 
 162 See supra note 34, at 75-77; see also supra note 35, at 1, 14. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Negotiations on a proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (“MAI”) were 
launched by member governments at the Annual Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial 
level in May 1995. Negotiations, however, were terminated in April 1998. 
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multilateral agreement on a global basis. The agreement will be able to adopt 
substantive norms as well as ISDS proceedings in the form of a multilateral 
court. Under the umbrella of this multilateral agreement, each state may 
adopt a bilateral agreement elaborating specific provisions in a way that is 
consistent with the multilateral agreement as with the WTO regime. 165 
Disputes arising from the multilateral agreement and from bilateral 
elaboration agreements will be referred to the multilateral court, again as with 
the WTO regime.166 This path will be more difficult to follow and final 
consensus will be more elusive, because harmonization of substantive norms 
would be more challenging and time-consuming than mere ISDS 
proceedings. As such, it is more practical and realistic to focus on the first 
option of a multilateral court – i.e., concluding a convention to replace 
existing ISDS proceedings with multilateral court proceedings and permit 
new IIAs to subscribe to the new proceedings. It may not offer a complete 
solution to the fragmented structure of international investment law, but it 
will still be able to address the current problem effectively. 
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE 
REFORM OF ISDS PROCEEDINGS 
Since its inception, ISDS proceedings of IIAs have fulfilled their role in 
settling investment disputes between foreign investors and host states’ 
governments. At the same time, the ISDS proceedings have become the focal 
point of the global attention: the level of attention directed at ISDS 
proceedings is increasing rapidly and continuously. Legal complexities and 
political sensitivities associated with investment arbitration have made both 
foreign investors and sovereign states realize the acute difficulties of 
participating in and dealing with this international dispute settlement 
mechanism. Unique traits of the ISDS proceedings have invited continuing 
challenges by domestic observers of the legitimacy of the proceedings and 
their outcome. 
In particular, the fact that ISDS proceedings are conducted according to 
respective IIAs on a one-time basis by party-appointed ad hoc arbitrators has 
recently brought about challenges concerning the legitimacy and 
appropriateness of the proceedings. It is against this backdrop that 
discussions on standing investment courts are currently taking place at 
                                                          
 165 See GATT 1994, art. XXIV; GATS, art. V. 
 166 It is true that FTAs have their own dispute settlement mechanism for trade disputes at 
the moment, but they are hardly used and FTA parties still prefer to bring their disputes to the 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings, unless the issues are entirely FTA-specific ones. So 
even with multiple FTAs, trade disputes still find their way to the WTO’s multilateral dispute 
settlement mechanism, if at all possible. This situation explains why even with bilaterally 
elaborated agreements, it will not be a particular hurdle for investment disputes to be referred 
to a multilateral court. This will be particularly true if the bilaterally elaborated agreements 
are supposed to ‘elaborate’ the provisions of the multilateral agreement umbrella. The court 
can then interpret consistently and provide consistent jurisprudence. 
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various fora. It is believed that the introduction of standing courts with more 
a systematized structure will be able to address or at least alleviate basic 
concerns over ISDS proceedings. The proposals table both bilateral courts 
and a multilateral court. At present, immediate attention is given to bilateral 
investment courts to be established under respective IIAs. Negotiations to 
create and insert bilateral investment courts are in full swing and leading to 
the actual establishment of such courts. On the other hand, negotiation for a 
multilateral court has yet to start. Even if negotiation begins, it is not clear 
how long it will take and whether it will indeed lead to a successful 
conclusion. Prior experience, including the most recent one involving the 
Mauritius Convention, tells us that such negotiations will take a significant 
amount of time before a multilateral court enters into full operation, even if 
consensus is somehow reached in the global community. This means that for 
a significant amount of time in the future, states will have to deal with their 
investment disputes through bilateral investment courts. 
Bilateral investment courts, however, will further deepen the already 
existing fragmentation of international investment law. They will also be 
unable to issue harmonized and consistent jurisprudence for similar or 
essentially the same legal issues. Bilateral courts will more easily stoke 
sovereignty infringement claims by domestic critics. If legitimacy 
enhancement is the ultimate objective of the present ISDS reform 
suggestions, bilateral courts will hardly contribute to this. 
The objective of legitimacy enhancement and “rule of law” permeation 
will only be achieved through a multilateral court. Negotiations to establish 
a multilateral court will by no means be easy. But this is the only alternative 
to address the basic concern that has prompted the ISDS reform debates in 
general, and the court proposals in particular. Global efforts should be 
mobilized to initiate and conclude negotiations for the establishment of a 
multilateral court as promptly as possible. In the interim, negotiations to 
create and adopt bilateral courts should be suspended. The limited resources 
of states should be directed at and focused on the introduction of a 
multilateral court, as opposed to half-fulfilling and further fragmentary 
bilateral courts. It should be borne in mind that standing bilateral courts, as 
they are currently proposed, may run the risk of stoking further concerns and 
imposing additional burdens on states and governments. 
There are various practical and legal issues to be contemplated carefully 
in considering standing courts in ISDS proceedings. What has been absent 
from the recent discussion, however, is a comprehensive and multi-
dimensional analysis of direct and indirect implications from various 
proposals, in particular from the introduction of standing international 
investment courts. Discussions on the reform of international investment 
dispute settlement proceedings should preferably be carried out with a 
holistic approach in mind, mindful of the interconnection of all individual 
issues. Otherwise, a reform that cures one problem may inadvertently 
introduce another, perhaps bigger, one. 
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